

November 6, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation. Our intention was just the opposite: to stick to a well-known list, and not to introduce any new factors. But there is really only one major item on the list, beyond the missiles and their equipment, and that is the light bombers with their equipment. This item is indeed of great importance to us.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second, in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba, and so it seems clear to me that our exchange of letters covers the IL-28s, since your undertaking was to remove the weapons we described as offensive.

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s is not a minor matter for us

Copies to @ Mr. Lamm  
@ Mr. McCon  
@ The Attorney General  
Copies to Ambassador  
Zolner  
@ State for  
Frank Thompson  
By Read by Kelly  
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at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than missiles, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus in the present context their continued presence would sustain the grave tension that has been created, and their removal, in my view, is necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side we are insisting only on what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr.

Kusnetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. I cannot accept this view; not only did this action threaten the whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument, what actually happened in this case was not simply that the action of your side was secret. Your Government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate.

I do not refer here only to the TASS article of September, but also to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary in regard to these assurances is, as we agreed, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is an essential safeguard for the United States and the other countries of this hemisphere, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, as we much prefer, a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere

with this surveillance which is so important to us all in obtaining reliable information on which improvements in the situation can be based. It was of great importance, for example, for me last week to be able to announce with confidence that dismantling of missiles had begun.

Finally, I would like to say a word about longer range matters. I think we must both recognise that it will be very difficult for any of us in this hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remains in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurring possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. That is why I think there is much wisdom in the conclusion expressed in your letter of October 26th, that when our undertakings against invasion are effective the need for your military specialists in Cuba will disappear. That is the real path to progress in the Cuban problem. And in this connection in particular, I hope you will understand that we must attach the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.

I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this hemisphere unless it ceases to appear to be a foreign military base and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their

supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued safeguards in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and give attention to other problems which ought to be resolved in the interest of peace.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Nikita S. Khrushchev  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

DRAFT  
11/6/62

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. I cannot believe that there could have been any doubt in your mind that IL-28s, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were included.

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s,



or any possible future matter of submarines, is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than rockets, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus their continued presence would have the same effect in creating grave tension that the missiles would have, and their removal, in my view, is quite as necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely

agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side, we are insisting only on the bare minimum of what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. But I cannot accept this view; I think you would not either, if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends. And however one may judge that argument, the fact of the matter is not only that we were not informed of what your Government was doing secretly in Cuba, but that active steps were taken to mislead us about what was being done.

I do not refer here to the TASS article of September, but rather to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to

restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time -- while public and private reassurances were being given -- there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with the minimum necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some measure of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but

simply stating the bare minimum of what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary for me to be able to give these assurances is, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real assurances against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is entirely essential for the United States, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless,

a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance, which has the full support of the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, I would like to say a word about my expression of confidence that when we are able "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise." We will indeed be ready to use our influence in this direction if the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are carried out, but I should tell you in all frankness that these are sovereign countries and that their willingness to give such assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will cease to be a threat to their security. The same consideration will face the American people as they frame their attitudes toward Cuba after this immediate crisis is surmounted. I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this Hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a significant military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remain in Cuba large

number of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. In this connection in particular, I hope you understand that we would be bound to regard any move to establish a submarine base in Cuba just as seriously as we regarded the installation of missile bases and bombers.

In summary, I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by a foreign power from outside the Hemisphere and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued reassurance in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis, and unless we take it promptly, I do not see how renewed action on our side can be avoided.

*To open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and to give attention to other aspects of the problem in the context of peace.*

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

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DRAFT  
11/6/62

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. *It seemed very clear speech from the declaration* I cannot believe that there could have *further language suggested by* been any doubt in your mind that IL-28s, capable of carrying nuclear *Does. But will help* weapons, were included.

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s,

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or any possible future matter of submarines, is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than <sup>missiles</sup> rockets, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus <sup>in the present context</sup> their continued presence would have the same effect in creating grave tension that the missiles would have, and their removal, in my view, is quite as necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely

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agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side, we are insisting only on the bare minimum of what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. But I cannot accept this view; <sup>because of historical & treaty responsibilities in this hemisphere</sup> I think you would not either, if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends. And however one may judge that argument, the fact of the matter is not only that we were not informed of what your Government was doing secretly in Cuba, but that active steps were taken to mislead us about what was being done.

*Bundy  
attested  
McCloy  
draft*

I do not refer here to the TASS article of September, but <sup>only (K)</sup> ~~also~~ <sup>the</sup> rather to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to

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restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time -- while public and private reassurances were being given -- there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with the <sup>minimum</sup> necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some <sup>degree</sup> measure of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but

simply stating the bare minimum of what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary *in regard* ~~for me to be able to give~~ <sup>to</sup> these assurances is ~~the~~ <sup>as was agreed the</sup> verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real ~~assurances~~ <sup>safeguards</sup> against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is <sup>an</sup> ~~entirely~~ essential <sup>safeguard</sup> ~~for the United States~~ <sup>and the other countries of this hemisphere</sup>, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, *as we much prefer, a better & durable method can be found*

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a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance, which has the full support of the Western Hemisphere. <sup>etc.</sup> *(+ in here)*

*you will agree the world will agree!*  
Finally, I would like to say a word about my expression of confidence that when we are able to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. ~~We will indeed~~ be ready to use our influence in this

direction if the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are carried out, but I should tell you in all frankness that <sup>the ability of these</sup> these are

sovereign countries and that their willingness to give such assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will cease to be a threat to their security. <sup>but</sup> *[* The same consideration will face the

American people as they frame their attitudes toward Cuba after this immediate crisis is surmounted. *]* I think we must both recognize that

it will be very difficult for any of us in this Hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a significant military outpost of the Soviet Union. <sup>directly capable of becoming dangerous</sup> We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think

it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remain in Cuba large

number of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. In this connection in particular, I hope you

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In summary, I believe that Cuba can never have normal

relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by a foreign power from outside the Hemisphere and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued *reassurance*

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<sup>not</sup> I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side, we are insisting only on the bare minimum of what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. <sup>But</sup> In order to make our position clear, I think I should <sup>go on to</sup> give you <sup>a</sup> full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States. ~~I am sure I need not~~ <sup>There</sup> ~~tell you that~~ recent events have <sup>given</sup> provided a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said ~~the other day~~ yesterday to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. But I cannot accept this view; I think you would not either, if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends. <sup>And</sup> But however one may judge that <sup>argument</sup> ~~agreement~~, the fact of the matter is not only that we were not informed of what your Government was doing secretly in Cuba, but that active steps were taken to mislead us about what was being done.

I do not refer here to the TASS article of September, but rather to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba<sub>X</sub> which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even in Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time -- while public and private reassurances were being given -- there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us.

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In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with the minimum necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some measure of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating the bare minimum of what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. <sup>And</sup> But the very minimum <sup>that</sup> of what is necessary for me to <sup>to be able to give these</sup> ~~stick to this~~ assurance <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real assurances against their reintroduction.

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ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but I must emphasize that the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is entirely essential for the United States, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October, after very clear assurances had been given.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance, which has the full support of the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, I would like to say a word about my expression of confidence that when we are able "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. We will indeed be ready to use our influence in this direction if the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are carried out, but I should tell you in all frankness that these are

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sovereign countries and that their willingness to give such assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will cease to be a threat to their security. The same <sup>question consideration</sup> consideration will <sup>be given by the American people as they consider as they think</sup> be given by the people of this country as we consider what our <sup>attitude toward</sup> relationships with Cuba may be after this immediate crisis is <sup>I think we must both recognize that it</sup> surmounted. It will be very difficult for any of us in this Hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues ~~in any way~~ to be a significant military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remain in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, <sup>with and</sup> <sup>systems</sup> major weapons and communications complexes <sup>all with</sup> under Soviet control, and the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. In this connection in particular, I hope you understand that we would be bound to regard any <sup>move to establish a</sup> <sup>base in</sup> support for Soviet submarines ~~from~~ Cuba just as seriously as we regarded the installation of missile bases and bombers. <sup>In summary, I believe that</sup> Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by a foreign power from outside the Hemisphere and ~~who~~ adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope

that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, <sup>and</sup> with a proper system for continued reassurance in the future that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis, and unless we take it promptly, I do not see how renewed action on our side can be avoided.

# #

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*Insert A*

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL28's, or any other possible future matter of submarines, is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than rockets, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus their continued presence would have the same effect in creating grave tension that the missiles would have, and their removal, in my view, is quite as necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

Your letter speaks as if our list was long and complicated, and I agree that lawyers drafting proclamations often include more words than you and I would. But our side will not make complications over the details of such language as <sup>this</sup> ~~mechanical or electronic equipment~~ to

~~"support the above items."~~ It is simply the missiles and bombers and their necessary supporting equipment which are essential to me.

In a larger sense, Mr. Chairman, the real risk in this confrontation has been that our efforts to understand each other and to work together might be permanently broken down by a move on your part which could not be accepted here and against which very clear assurances had been given. There is really no safety for either of us in any attempt on your side to establish a permanent Soviet military base in Cuba, and therefore I am glad of your repeated assurances that this is really not your intention. The most significant contribution which your side could make, over time, would be the full withdrawal of all Soviet military personnel. I think your mind may be moving in the same direction, from some of the comments in your important letter of October 26. But our side has not made any such withdrawal a formal condition of settlement, nor do I do so now. All that I am doing in this letter is to explain as clearly as I can that the IL28 bombers are indeed offensive weapons, as we understand them, and that in our judgment they are fully covered by our exchange of letters of October 27 and October 28. It seems to us much better that they should be removed on this basis than that we should have to consider some further action to fulfill our commitments within this Hemisphere.



We have just as much interest as you in avoiding any new aggravation of the situation.

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

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*Cop, L O Thompson himself  
to Mr. N. N. (and)*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1962

To: William H. Brubeck

From: Bromley Smith

Will you please see that Ambassador Thompson is provided with a copy of the attached. Any additional distribution within the Department should be in accordance with Ambassador Thompson's instruction. He also has a copy of the Khrushchev letter of November 5.

DRAFT  
11/6/62  
(dictated by Captain Shepard)

Dear Mr. Chairman

I received your recent letter and I wish to give you as fully as possible the strong feelings we have about the matter here.

In the first place, I need not tell you of the profound shock which recent events have provided to relations between our two countries.

You may state, as Mr. Kuznetsov stated yesterday to Mr. McCloy,

that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any

activities it was carrying on in a third country. I <sup>cannot</sup> ~~do not~~ accept

this view, nor would you if the activities being carried on in a third

country were intended to alter the balance of power in the world

upon which our present uneasy peace so much depends. The fact

of the matter, however, is not only were we not informed of events

in a third country, but active steps were taken to misinform us about

what was being done.

I am not now referring to the TASS article of September but to

the communications which were addressed to the highest levels

of our government through channels which heretofore had been used

for confidential communications from the highest levels of your

government. Through these channels <sup>we</sup> were specifically informed

that no missiles would be placed in Cuba, which would have a range

capable of reaching the United States. Believing that those <sup>assurances</sup> represented

a commitment which would be met, I attempted, as you know, to

restrain those who were warning us of the trend of events in Cuba.

*Then the undeniable evidence that offensive weapons were*

[The fact that my government misjudged the course of events in Cuba  
*being installed was a deep and dangerous shock first*  
has given a most profound shock to my country.]

*to our government and then to our whole people.*

*Let me ask you to consider how you would have felt*  
If there had been set up in Finland a government of increasing

*if* *even in Sweden*  
hostility to you, and then during <sup>the</sup> comparatively brief period,

*and private*  
while public reassurances were being given ~~as~~ there had been

Finland  
-3- am action from our side. But that  
is how ~~the~~ action of your side in  
Cuba appears to us,  
clandestinely sent to ~~Cuba~~ a whole variety of dangerous means

~~destruction~~  
of ~~construction~~ which had been belatedly discovered, you know how the  
government &  
Soviet people would have reacted to such  
~~some idea of the feeling in this country.~~ Now why then am I so

persistent in wanting this matter settled quickly and completely?

First, because in ~~some measure~~ I believe it vital that we reestablish  
some  
a measure of confidence and communication between you and me. If  
leaders of the  
the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with ~~precision~~ <sup>some accuracy</sup> the intention  
of ~~the~~ other, <sup>each we shall face</sup> this will mean an increasingly dangerous period for the  
~~two of us.~~

<sup>you</sup>  
Secondly, in return for the commitments of yours I gave certain  
commitments on behalf of the United States, <sup>in particular a commitment that</sup> among them that we  
would not invade Cuba. This commitment, <sup>which has already</sup> has been under attack,  
and will become increasingly <sup>an</sup> the object of criticism <sup>by a</sup> by a great many  
of my countrymen. If after all we have gone through there ~~remains~~

~~It can only be kept if the~~ It

<sup>remains</sup> <sup>a Soviet</sup> <sup>including Soviet-manned</sup>  
~~or leaves~~) in Cuba <sup>^</sup> military base which could quickly become offensive <sup>^</sup>

SAM sites, heavy aircraft, large numbers of technicians, jet

<sup>and</sup>  
bombers, with a possibility that mobile missiles bases could quickly

be introduced. Combined with these facts is Castro's opposition to

UN on-the-ground-inspection and announced opposition to air

reconnaissance which at present gives us some degree of security.

Under these conditions, even though the missiles might be withdrawn

if the SAM sites remain, if the bombers remain, if a fishing harbor

is constructed which could submarines, if Russian

technicians remain, if the Cubans object to air surveillance, use

SAM missiles against it and refuse to agree to on-the-ground inspection

then the whole threat could rise again in the period of a comparatively

few days and we would once again be faced with dangerous events.

Already we have reports of missiles being hidden in caves, although

I accept your word that they are not; of carriers and other

missile-supporting devices being also hidden; of a refusal to withdraw bombers, many of which are flown by Soviet pilots. All this while Castro remains guaranteed against invasion.

The best way, in my opinion, to draw the poison from this situation to provide genuine security for the Cubans would be to withdraw the missiles and the supporting equipment with adequate inspection, withdraw the bombers and the Soviet military personnel and to arrange with us for some international or national system of periodic air surveillance to give us the reassurance we need against a repetition of the events of the past days. This is the way to peace in the Caribbean. This is the way to provide security in Cuba. This is the way for us to move on to agreement in other vital areas.